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LET'S TALK ABOUT SEX: SCHOOL SURVEYS AND PARENTS'




In a perfect world, school surveys asking students about sex, drugs,
alcohol and suicide would introduce teenagers to topics and behaviors
that they have never encountered before.' The reality, however, is that
junior high and high school students are having sex, using drugs, abusing
alcohol and contemplating suicide.2 To combat these issues, schools
across the country are administering surveys questioning students about
their experience with these topics. 3 While the surveys provide school
boards and local governments with vital information concerning the youth
of this country, parents are fighting to keep these surveys out of the class-
room, arguing that schools are depriving parents of their fundamental
right to make decisions concerning the upbringing of their children. 4
1. See Phyllis Schlafly, Courts Hit Parents with Triple Whammy, EAGLEFORUM.ORG,
Dec. 21, 2005, http://www.eagleforum.org/column/2005/decO5/05-12-21.html
(arguing that misleading questions on sensitive topics has powerful effect on chil-
dren given their lack of maturity).
2. See, e.g., Lisa Kim Bach, School Survey Finds Increase in Teen Sex, LAS
VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, Feb. 1, 2000, at 1B (detailing Nevada survey finding that
high school students answered as follows during anonymous survey: 49.5% had
used marijuana, 20% had considered committing suicide in past year and 53% had
consumed alcohol in past thirty days); Ruma Banerji Kumar, Survey Finds Risky Be-
havior Among Students, The Com. Appeal (Memphis, Tenn.), Sept. 28, 2004, at B3
(outlining Memphis city high school survey showing more than 60% of students
have had sex, more than one-quarter drank before age thirteen and almost half
have smoked marijuana); Matt Viser, High School Survey Looks at Risky Behaviors;
Finds 70 Percent of Local Students Consider Themselves Overly Stressed, BOSTON GLOBE,
Oct. 24, 2002, at I (calculating that more than half of students have engaged in sex
and have drank alcohol).
3. See George Archibald, Mrs. Ridge Promotes Survey on Sex, Drugs; Information
Used to Gain Grants, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2003, at A01 (identifying Communities
That Care, that developed "youth survey used in more than 400 communities na-
tionwide to collect personal information from students to help local governments
justify federal and foundation grant applications").
4. See Brian Kladko, Parents Press for Consent Before School Sex Surveys, BOSTON
GLOBE, Oct. 23, 2005, at BI (explaining school boards conduct surveys to "uncover
dangerous trends"); see also C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 181 (3d
Cir. 2005) (accepting that Town of Ridgewood administered survey "in an attempt
to obtain information directly related to the understanding and prevention of the
social problems confronting today's youth"). But see Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S.
57, 66 (2000) (accepting that Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tects parents' fundamental right to make decisions concerning "care, custody and
control of their children").
(1085)
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Who has the responsibility-or privilege-of introducing children to
the sensitive issues that surround them every day?5 Recently, the Third
Circuit took on this balancing act, weighing parents' fundamental right to
raise their children against a school's ability to control the curriculum and
the school environment. 6 Between their peers, media advertising and the
Internet-all typically beyond the strict control of a parent-it is not hard
for children to learn about drugs, sex and alcohol. 7 Whether it is the com-
munity's or parent's responsibility to introduce students to these topics,
one fact remains true, someone has to teach them because they are going
to learn this information from other-often times less reliable-sources. 8
This Casebrief identifies the Third Circuit's preferred constitutional-
ity analysis of school surveys challenged under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and serves as a guide to practitioners bringing or defending against
these challenges. 9 Part II reviews the Supreme Court and other circuit
court decisions that shape the current boundaries of the right of parents
to raise their children as they see fit. 10 Part III analyzes CN. v. Ridge-
wood,11 setting forth the Third Circuit's holding that administering an in-
voluntary survey did not violate the constitutional rights of parents. 12 Part
IV evaluates parents' right to raise their children as they see fit against the
5. See Kelly Rodden, Note, The Children's Internet Protection Act in Public Schools:
The Government Stepping on Parents' Toes?, 71 FoRDHAM L. REV. 2141, 2152-55 (2003)
(summarizing changing parental right to raise their children under Fourteenth
Amendment and students' right to access information). Public schools already
play a major role in educating students about health and sex. See generally The
HenryJ. Kaiser Family Foundation, SEX Education in America: A View from Inside
the Nation's Classrooms, Sept. 22, 2000, http://www.kff.org/youthhivstds/3048-
index.cfm (finding virtually all public schools provide some sexual education for
students between seventh and twelfth grades).
6. See Ridgewood, 430 F.3d at 185 (considering whether student survey contain-
ing topics on sex, drugs, alcohol and suicide violated parents' fundamental right to
raise their children); see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271
(1988) (noting educators' authority over curriculum extends to events and activi-
ties outside "traditional classroom setting"); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
493 (1954) (promoting idea that education extends beyond mere curriculum).
7. See Ridgewood, 430 F.3d at 185 (explaining "myriad of influences sur-
round[ing] middle and high school students"); see also Barbara Bennett Wood-
house, Reframing the Debate About the Socialization of Children: An Environmentalist
Paradigm, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 85, 97-119 (2004) (examining effects of mass-
media culture on children).
8. See generally HILLARV RODHAM CLINTON, IT TAKES A VILLAGE: AND OTHER
LESSONS CHILDREN TEACH US (Simon & Schuster 1996) (explaining that by looking
honestly at condition of our children, by understanding wealth of new information
research offers us about them, and by listening to children themselves, we can
begin more fruitful discussion about their needs).
9. For an analysis of the Third Circuit's opinion in C.N. v. Ridgewood Board of
Education, see infra notes 84-100 and accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of parental decision-making precedent, see infra notes 16-
64 and accompanying text.
11. 430 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2005).
12. For an analysis of the Third Circuit's reasoning to deny the parents' Four-
teenth Amendment claim, see infra notes 89-100 and accompanying text.
1086 [Vol. 51: p. 1085
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 5 [2006], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol51/iss5/5
reality that children need to be educated about sensitive topics at a young
age. 13 This section also supports the prediction that the Third Circuit will
continue to be lenient in its approach of policing school curricula. 14 Part
V concludes with suggestions for practitioners in the Third Circuit, identi-
fying the relevant policy issues and recommending approaches for effec-
tive litigation of this issue. 5
II. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Overview
"[I] t cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make de-
cisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children." 16 In
the 1920s, the Supreme Court recognized, in both Meyer v. Nebraska17 and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,18 that parents have a fundamental due process
right to control the education and upbringing of their children. 19 The
Meyer-Pierce right, however, has changed substantially over the past thirty
13. For rationales on whether schools have the authority to survey students,
see infra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
14. For support of this author's prediction, see infra notes 101-33 and accom-
panying text.
15. For suggestions to Third Circuit practitioners, see infra notes 134-44 and
accompanying text.
16. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (finding that visitation order
was unconstitutional infringement on mother's fundamental right to make deci-
sions concerning care, custody and control of her two daughters); see also Gruenke
v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 303-04 (3d Cir. 2000) (acknowledging that "[t]he right of
parents to raise their children without undue state interference is well estab-
lished"). The Fourteenth Amendment also includes a substantive component that
"provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fun-
damental rights and liberty interests." See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
719 (1997) (reasoning that Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause "guaran-
tees more than fair process").
17. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
18. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
19. See id. at 534-35 (acknowledging parents' fight to direct upbringing and
education of their children); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400 (recognizing parents' fight to
control education of their children). The court often refers to this fundamental
liberty as the Meyer-Pierce right because it was first enunciated in these two Supreme
Court cases. See also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Speaking Truth to Power: Challeng-
ing "The Power of Parents to Control the Education of Their Own", 11 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 481, 482 (2002) (acknowledging "power of parents to control the edu-
cation of their own," as common-law power that was constitutionalized in Meyer and
Pierce).
Before the Supreme Court acknowledged the Meyer-Pierce right, state courts
used common law to resolve disputes between schools and parents concerning
school-required curriculum or activities. See, e.g., Hardwick v. Bd. of Sch. Trs., 205
P. 49, 54 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921) (illustrating California court decision prohibit-
ing schools from requiring student participation in social and folk dancing be-
cause it violated parents' right to control education of their children). Parents
rarely were successful in advancing common law claims and, therefore, needed a
constitutional right to assert to combat the state legislature shifting power to
20061 CASEBRIEF 1087
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years due to judicial and legislative attempts to balance the state's author-
ity to educate students against parents' natural authority to raise their chil-
dren. 2° Parents' fundamental right to raise their children as they see fit
will give way in certain circumstances to a school's ability to control curric-
ulum and the school environment. 2' Moreover, while the Supreme Court
has never been called upon to define the precise boundaries of the paren-
tal right to control the upbringing of children, it is clear that this right is
neither absolute nor unqualified. 22
The topic of sex in schools has been highly debated in recent years. 23
In Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Products, Inc.,24 the First Circuit ruled that
mandatory student attendance at a sexually explicit AIDS awareness assem-
bly did not rise to an intrusion of constitutional magnitude on parents'
right to direct the upbringing and control of their children. 25 Similarly,
the Third Circuit rejected a familial right to privacy claim in the context of
a voluntary high school condom distribution program accompanied by a
parental opt-out provision in Parents United for Better Schools, Inc. v. School
District of Philadelphia Board of Education.26 The debate in these cases is
schools. See Ralph D. Mawdsley, The Changing Face of Parents' Rights, 2003 BYU
Eouc. & L.J. 165, 168 (2003) (detailing starting point for Meyer-Pierce right).
20. See Mawdsley, supra note 19, at 165-66 (noting parents' rights have evolved
and have been influenced by changing perspectives concerning rights of students,
school boards and justiciable causes of action). After the Meyer-Pierce period, the
Supreme Court addressed state authority to apply facially neutral compulsory at-
tendance laws to religious, nonpublic schools. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 233-34 (1972) (rejecting application of state attendance law to Amish because
their religious beliefs required that their children attend school only until eighth
grade). Yoderwas the high point of parents' religious-based educational decisions.
See Mawdsley, supra note 19, at 174-75 (describing transition into current judicial
environment).
21. See, e.g., Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d 694, 699-700 (10th
Cir. 1998) (acknowledging school policy against part time attendance did not vio-
late parents' right to direct upbringing of child); Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro
City Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174, 179 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding mandatory student
participation in community service problem did not violate parents' right to direct
upbringing of their children).
22. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983) (advancing constitutional
protection for parent-child relationship in "appropriate cases"); see also Croft v.
Westmoreland County Children and Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1125 (3d Cir.
1997) (noting parents' right to manage children is "not absolute" and is "limited
by a compelling government interest in the protection of children").
23. See Woodhouse, supra note 19, at 490-91 (discussing dangers of lack of sex
education). Courts have held that schools are not obligated to shield children of
objecting parents from accessing condoms or obtaining information about sex. See
id. at 491 (determining alternatively that no court has ever upheld child's affirma-
tive right to access information about sex education or condoms from school).
24. 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995).
25. See id. at 533 (rejecting parents' claims that assembly deprived privacy
rights, substantive due process rights and their right to educational environment
free from sexual harassment).
26. 148 F.3d 260, 274-75 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding Board's policy of providing
consent form contained adequate notice provisions designed to effectively inform
parents of condom distribution program). Public junior high and high schools
1088 [Vol. 51: p. 1085
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 5 [2006], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol51/iss5/5
fueled by the clash of constitutional rights: the minor's right to informa-
tion against parents' right to authority over their child.
27
Currently, the precise scope of a parent's liberty interest remains un-
clear. 28 The law acknowledging parental rights in the nineteenth century
has changed in large part because everything around the law has
changed.29 The lack of protection of parents' right to direct education
within the public school is largely due to the greater authority that the
Supreme Court has given to school officials in controlling curriculum.
30
Parents continue to maintain other avenues-such as home schooling and
enrolling their children in private schools-as educational substitutes for
public schools, but these avenues are often far more costly. 3 1
B. Actions "Striking the Heart" of Parental Decision-Making Authority
Circuit courts strictly construe actionable violations of the familial pri-
vacy right to encompass only those instances where a state official's action
is aimed directly at the parent-child relationship. 32 The Third Circuit,
nationwide have begun distributing condoms to students to combat the growing
number of teenagers infected with the HIV virus and teenage pregnancy. See Mi-
randa Perry, Comment, Kids and Condoms: Parental Involvement in School Condom-
Distribution Programs, 63 U. Cni. L. REv. 727, 727-28 (1996) (noting parents' argu-
ment that schools-to which they are legally required to send their children-implic-
itly condone sexual activity by distributing condoms).
27. See CatherineJ. Ross, An Emerging Right for Mature Minors to Receive Informa-
tion, 2 U. PA.J. CONsT. L. 223, 251 (1999) (arguing importance of minors' ability to
obtain information on topics such as abortion and sex).
28. See Perry, supra note 26, at 735 (explaining activist government has re-
cently given more rights to public schools while taking away parental rights).
29. See Mawdsley, supra note 19, at 190 (noting when students were granted
constitutional rights by Supreme Court, "inevitable question... was whose rights-
the parents or the students-were school officials going to deal with"). See generally
C.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (ruling student expression is
part of school curriculum). Alternatively, some courts have limited student expres-
sion in light of recent instances. See Katie Hammett, School Shootings, Ceramic Tiles,
and Hazelwood: The Continuing Lessons of the Columbine Tragedy, 55 ALA. L. REv. 393,
399-400 (2004) (recognizing school officials at Columbine High School-without
justification-were allowed to regulate school-sponsored speech that discriminated
based on viewpoint).
30. See Mawdsley, supra note 19, at 190 (listing Bethel School District v. Fraser,
478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S.
260, 271-72 (1988), as cases where Supreme Court initiated movement allowing
school officials to have strict control over school curriculum).
31. See Michael Smith, Complete Control over What Is Taught, WASH. TIMES, Nov.
28, 2005, at B04 (discussing alternatives to public schools for parents); see also
Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1206 (9th Cir. 2005) (establishing
parents' decision-making right lessens once they have chosen to enroll their stu-
dent in public school rather than choosing private or home schooling). For a
discussion on the problems with having private schools and home schooling as the
only alternative, see infra note 142 and accompanying text.
32. See Pittsley v. Warish, 927 F.2d 3, 8-9 (lst Cir. 1991) (explaining that police
threat to children that they would never see arrested family member again, and
refusing to let them kiss him goodbye did not violate family's privacy right); see also
Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1977) (finding liberty interest
20061 CASEBRIEF 1089
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however, does not hesitate to recognize a constitutional violation when a
school deprives parents of their right to make vital decisions concerning
their children. 3  It is not educators, but parents, who maintain the pri-
mary right in the upbringing of children.3 4 Although students may not
enjoy the same privacy rights as free adults, limitations still exist that pro-
tect students from all intrusions by school authorities.
35
In Gruenke v. Seip,36 a parent filed suit against a school swimming
coach for violating her constitutional rights when the coach forced her
daughter to take a pregnancy test.37 The swim coach believed the daugh-
ter-a seventeen year old member of the varsity swim team-was pregnant
after he observed that she "was often nauseated, made frequent trips to
the bathroom, and complained about having a low energy level." 3 8 After
witnessing those events, the swim coach talked to other students, faculty
and parents-but not the student's parent-about the student's suspected
condition.3 9 Finally, after multiple attempts, the swim coach required the
student to take a pregnancy test.4° The student's parent asserted that the
swim coach's action deprived her of the right to make decisions concern-
in family privacy was deprived without due process when children were not re-
turned to mother).
33. See Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 306 (3d Cir. 2000) (recognizing distinc-
tion between actions that strike at heart of parental decision-making authority and
those that merely complicate making and implementing parental decisions); see
also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304 (1993) (finding so long as parent adequately
cares for his or her children, there will normally be no reason for state to inject
itself into private realm of family to further question ability of that parent to make
best decisions concerning rearing of that parent's children).
34. See C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 183 (3d Cir. 2005) (not-
ing school-sponsored counseling and psychological testing that pry into private
family activities can overstep boundaries of school authority and impermissibly
usurp fundamental right of parents to bring up their children). Further, the court
explained that "[p]ublic schools must not forget that 'in loco parentis' does not
mean 'displace parents."' Id. (quoting Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 307).
35. See Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 302-03 (finding that school coach violated stu-
dent's privacy rights by disclosing results of her pregnancy test); see also Vernonia
Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995) (holding that although Court ap-
proved drug tests at schools, it was also careful to indicate that tests were inappro-
priate to determine whether student is-for example-epileptic, pregnant or
diabetic).
36. 225 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 2000).
37. See id. at 295-97 (outlining events occurring before positive pregnancy test
was returned).
38. Id. at 295-96 (noting after coach confirmed with assistant coach that plain-
tiff's daughter ("Leah") was exhibiting changes in behavior and physical appear-
ance, coach "approached Leah and attempted to discuss sex and pregnancy with
her").
39. See id. at 305-06 (acknowledging court found it was strange that guidance
counselor, aware of situation, apparently did not advise coach to notify parents).
40. See id. at 296-97 (providing that five days after coach required plaintiffs
daughter to submit to pregnancy test, Leah learned at doctor's appointment that
she was six months pregnant).
1090 [Vol. 51: p. 1085
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ing her child.4 1 The Third Circuit found that this case "present[ed] ...
another example of the arrogation of the parental role by a school .... 42
In Arnold v. Board of Education,43 parents alleged that school officials
coerced their child, a student in the school, to have an abortion and urged
her not to discuss the matter with her parents. 4 4 The Third Circuit in
Gruenke used Arnold as an example of a school's violation of familial integ-
rity.4 5 Similarly, the parent in Gruenke argued that "this teenage preg-
nancy was a family crisis in which the state, through [the coach], had no
right to obstruct the parental right to choose the proper method of resolu-
tion."46 The court in Gruenke agreed, ruling that the parent "sufficiently
alleged a constitutional violation."4
7
C. Playing with Boundaries: The Ninth Circuit in
Fields v. Palmdale School District
4 8
Recently, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of surveying when a
school questioned seven-to-ten-year-old students about controversial is-
sues.49 In Fields, parents gave permission for their elementary school stu-
dents to take part in a survey that the school district conducted regarding
41. See id. at 306 (summarizing that parents explained, "had not all the ad-
verse publicity occurred as the result of [the coach's] actions, they would have
quietly withdrawn [their daughter] from school, apparently after the state [swim]
meet, and sent her to Florida to live with her married sister").
42. See id. (explaining majority's ruling). In a concurring opinion, Judge
Roth agreed with the ultimate finding, but disagreed with the other two panel
members that the parent had stated a valid claim because, in her view, defendant
swim coach's behavior "merely complicated the Gruenkes' ability to make deci-
sions concerning the pregnancy." See id. at 308-10 (Roth, J., concurring) (finding
Gruenke "[was] free at all times to make whatever decision they pleased as to the
outcome of [their child's] pregnancy").
43. 880 F.2d 305 (11th Cir. 1989)
44. See id. at 312-14 (declining to hold that counselors are constitutionally
mandated to notify parents when their minor child receives counseling about
pregnancy, but nevertheless indicated, "[a] s a matter of common sense ... school
counselors should encourage communication with parents .... ").
45. See id. (explaining reasoning in finding violation of parental right). Un-
like Arnold, however, the court in Gruenke noted that the appropriation of the par-
ent's right was not as flagrant because the coach was not a counselor whose
guidance the daughter sought. See Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 307 (recounting coach was
acting "contrary to [daughter's] express wishes that he mind his own business").
46. Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 306 (noting daughter's "claim of deprivation of pri-
vacy . .. overlaps with, and is largely inseparable from, that of familial rights").
47. See id. at 307 (explaining that coach's claim for immunity was not defeated
because "record must establish that the right violated was clearly established").
48. 427 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2005).
49. See id. at 1200 (applying rational basis review instead of strict scrutiny to
analysis because court did not find claim to assert fundamental right). Alterna-
tively, government actions that infringe upon a fundamental right receive strict
scrutiny. See also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1977)
(holding state's restrictions on sale of contraceptives as unconstitutional intrusion
on right to decide privately whether to have children).
20061 1091
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psychological barriers to learning.50  After the survey, the parents
learned-many from their children-that some of the survey questions
were related to sexual topics. 5 1 In response, parents brought suit claiming
the school district violated their right to privacy and their right "to control
the upbringing of their children by introducing them to matters of and
relating to sex."5 2 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismis-
sal, finding that parents have no fundamental right to be the exclusive pro-
vider to their children of information regarding sexual matters.
53
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the parents' right to control a
child's education "does not extend beyond the threshold of the school
door."54 The court opined that parents possessed no constitutional right
to prevent schools from providing information on sex to their students in
the forum or manner selected by the school district. 55 Rather, the court
50. See Fields, 427 F.3d at 1200 (announcing goal of survey was to establish "a
community baseline measure of children's exposure to early trauma" (internal
quotations omitted)).
51. See id. at 1201 n.3 (outlining sexually explicit survey questions). The sur-
vey consisted of seventy-nine questions testing the frequency that the elementary
school student experienced different sensations, emotions, thoughts and exper-
iences. See id. at 1201 (commenting that school mental health counselor sat with
students to ensure they read and responded to each question).
52. Id. at 1200 (explaining that survey asked students about sexual topics such
as frequency of "thinking about having sex" and "thinking about touching other
peoples' private parts").
53. See id. at 1209 (noting "education is not merely about teaching basic read-
ing, writing, and arithmetic" but rather to serve "higher civic and social function"
for children).
54. Id. at 1207 (discussing courts' rationalization for denying application of
Meyer-Pierce right). Specifically, the court found that neither Meyer nor Pierce pro-
vided support for the view that parents have a right to prevent a school from pro-
viding any kind of information-sexual or otherwise-to its students. Id. at 1206
(noting that parents cited no cases to support argument that Meyer-Pierce controls
all matters relating to education and educational system); see also Brown v. Hot,
Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 534 (lst Cir. 1995) (explaining Meyer and
Pierce do not encompass broad-based right to restrict flow of information in public
schools).
This comment has been the subject of highly contested debate concerning
whether the Ninth Circuit went too far. See Phyllis Schlafly, Activist Courts Protect
Mental Health Screening of Children in Public Schools, COPLEY NEWS SERV., Nov. 15,
2005, http://www.eagleforum.org/column/2005/novO5/05-11-23.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 20, 2006) (claiming quote that parents' rights over education of their
children terminate at "the threshold of the school door" has stirred up tremen-
dous backlash); see also Linda P. Campbell, Jurisprudence: Be Careful What You Wish
for, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM (Texas), Nov. 11, 2005, http://www.dfw.com/
mld/dfw/news/columnists/linda_campbell/13130908.htm (last visited Feb. 20,
2006) (implying Ninth Circuit's comment would mean no more opting out of sex-
ed program, no more optional reading assignments for controversial book and no
mechanism for objecting to program that is clearly age-inappropriate).
55. See Fields, 427 F.3d at 1209 (rejecting parents' curriculum argument by
pointing out school is principle instrument in awakening child to cultural values
and helping him or her adjust normally to environment); see also Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 691 (1954) (reminding parents of state's compelling interest
in broad ends of education extending far beyond "curriculum").
1092
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agreed with the Sixth Circuit's finding in Blau v. Fort Thomas Public School
DistriCt5 6 that "parents have a fundamental right to decide whether to send
their child to public school, but they do not have a fundamental right to
direct how a public school teaches their child."57 In Blau, the Sixth Circuit
found that a school dress code did not violate a father's substantive due
process right to control the dress of his child. 5 8 In Fields, the court al-
lowed the survey questions because they were rationally related to the
school board's legitimate interest in the effective education and mental
welfare of children. 5
9
Following the Fields decision, a heated debate commenced concern-
ing the appropriate age to introduce children to sexually explicit mate-
rial. 6°1 Some commentators claim the Ninth Circuit allowed schools to
"interrogate elementary school children about their assumed sexual activi-
ties. ' ' 6 ' Other commentators took the opportunity to offer possible con-
structive solutions that would promote the idea that educators and parents
should work together as partners rather than potential adversaries. 62 Al-
though Fields seemed to stretch the boundary of allowing public schools to
create their own curriculum, extensive Supreme Court precedent sup-
ported this decision and acknowledged that "education serves higher civic
and social functions, including the rearing of children into healthy, pro-
ductive and responsible adults and the cultivation of talented and quali-
fied leaders of diverse backgrounds." 63 The Fields decision, however, left
56. 401 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2005)
57. See Fields, 427 F.3d at 1206 (quoting Blau, 401 F.3d at 395-96) (listing issues
that are generally committed to control of state and local authorities).
58. See Blau, 401 F.3d at 388 (asserting daughter's substantive due process
right to wear clothes of her own choice was not violated).
59. See Fields, 427 F.3d at 1210 (finding state's broad interest justified because
of parens patriae (country as parent)).
60. See Trevor Bothwell, Judicial Activism No Better from the Right, WAxSH.
TIMES, Dec. 11, 2005, at B05 (arguing Fields opinion was correct because court
protected Constitution). But see Editorial, Undermining Parental Contro4 C-IATrA-
NOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS (Tenn.), Nov. 25, 2005, at B7 (expressing liberal judges
took opportunity to create new law).
61. See Schlafly, supra note 54 (questioning how federal bureaucrats are going
to identify children at risk). See generally Beth Garrison, Note, "Children Are Not
Second Class Citizens": Can Parents Stop Public Schools from Treating Their Children Like
Guinea Pigs?, 39 VA.. U. L. REv. 147 (2004) (providing argument that public
schools' right to control curriculum does not give schools fight to use children in
these surveys).
62. See Charles J. Russo, Sexually Explicit Survey Raises Concerns About How Far
Schools Should Go in Directing Students' Education, YOUR SCH. & L., Dec. 14, 2005, at
Vol. 35, No. 22 (offering educators should consider following three points to help
maintain good relationship with parents: (1) consult with parents; (2) choose age-
appropriate material; (3) give parents choice).
63. See Fields, 427 F.3d at 1209 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003)) (validating law school admission policy that took race into account); see
also Smith, supra note 31, at B04 (noting home schooling as alternative for parents
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many critics questioning whether these civic and social functions are best
served by asking first graders about touching themselves.6 4
III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT TAKES ON SEX AND DRUG USE
A. The Survey: Content and Administration
In the Fall of 1999, school officials in the Ridgewood public school
district administered a survey entitled "Profiles of Student Life: Attitudes
and Behaviors" to students in grades seven through twelve. 65 The survey
questioned students about their knowledge and experience with drug and
alcohol use, sexual activity, experience of physical violence, attempts at
suicide, personal associations and relationships, and views on matters of
public interest.66 Prior to the administration of the survey, the Superin-
tendent sent a letter home to all of the parents outlining the purpose and
details of the survey.67 The letter stated that the survey itself was designed
to be voluntary and anonymous. 6 8
The survey contained 156 questions with fill-in-the-circle style answer
choices. 69 The content of the survey was undisputed; however, the parties
differed in their characterization of the survey and its effect on the partici-
64. See Fields, 427 F.3d at 1203 (contending parents should have right to "de-
termine when and how their children are exposed to sexually explicit subject mat-
ter"); see also Schlafly, supra note 54 (same).
65. See C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2005) (ex-
plaining that Human Resources Council of Village of Ridgewood in New Jersey-
organization comprised of public and private social services agencies-decided "to
survey Ridgewood's student population to better understand their needs, attitudes
and behavior patterns in order to use town programs and resources more
effectively").
66. See id. at 161-63 (identifying Search Institute of Minneapolis, Minnesota as
designers of survey). The survey was designed to measure the strength of forty
attributes and experiences known to promote a healthy and wholesome adoles-
cence. See id. at 162 n.3 (recalling it was not entirely clear how this particular
survey was chosen).
67. See id. at 164-65 (noting survey will "ask young people about attitudes and
behaviors relating to themselves, their school, and their community" and offering
opportunity for parents to review survey before administration). Prior to the ad-
ministration of the survey, the parent-teacher association ("PTA") held several
meetings and reported that members expressed "several serious reservations and
concerns" because the survey's explicit content seemed to suggest such activity was
within normal adolescent experience. See id. at 163 (describing preliminary objec-
tion made by parents).
68. See id. at 164 (referencing manual included with surveys from Search Insti-
tute of Minneapolis, Minnesota). The letter emphasized the following:
[First], [t]he survey is voluntary. This means you do not have to take it
and it is not a test that you take for school grades. Second, the survey is
filled out anony-mously. No one will know which survey booklet is yours
... Please do not put your name on the survey.
Id.
69. See id. at 166 (detailing administration of survey).
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pating students. 70 Survey questions ranged from asking students "[h]ow
many times" they "had used cocaine" in their lives, to questions such as
"have you ever tried to kill yourself."7 1 The survey also posed questions
about drinking and driving, how many times a student had sexual inter-
course, and whether students would feel comfortable speaking with their
parents about drugs, sex or other serious issues.72 Students were in-
structed not to put their name on the survey. 73 The completed surveys
were placed in a large box and locked in an office until they were sent to
Search Institute in early December 1999 for tabulation.
74
B. Constitutional Claims and Procedural Posture
Three students and their mothers ("Plaintiffs") brought an action
against the Ridgewood Board of Education ("School") claiming that the
survey had been administered so as to be involuntary and non-anonymous
and had thus violated their rights under the United States Constitution.
75
Specifically, Plaintiffs argued that requiring students to take this survey
violated their First Amendment right to refrain from speaking. 76 Further,
Plaintiffs made claims based on the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
70. See id. at 168 n.9 (recognizing "existence of long-lived public debate over
whether public schools should be situs of social research"). See generally Garrison,
supra note 61 (outlining history of social research in public schools). The PTA
eventually passed a motion in support of administering the survey after the school
assured parents that individuals' parents would have a right to exempt their child
from taking the survey. See Ridgewood, 430 F.3d at 165 (asserting that plaintiff
claimed school board promised written consent forms).
71. See id. at 168-69 (noting survey asked students "[h]ave you ever tried to kill
yourself" with acceptable answers being "no; yes, once; yes, twice; yes, more than
two times" and "how many times have you used cocaine in your life, or during the
last 12 months" with answer choices "0, 1, 2, 3-5, 6-9, 10-19, 20-39, and 40+").
72. See id. (explaining survey even asked questions about fictitious drugs in
effort to ensure quality of data reported); see also Kladko, supra note 4, at B1 (ob-
serving parents in Massachusetts school were most outraged with question that
asked children whether they believed oral sex was sex).
73. See Ridgewood, 430 F.3d at 167 (commenting that students were told by
instructors that "this survey is confidential," meaning "no one will be able to iden-
tify who completed individual surveys").
74. See id. at 170 (detailing procedure of security and tabulation of surveys).
The Ridgewood surveys were destroyed in March 2000. See id. (finding there was
no way individual studcnt could be identified or connected with their personal
information via this formTat).
75. See id. at 161 (discussing Plaintiff's statutory and constitutional claims); see
also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (permitting lawsuits for damages for "the deprivation
of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws").
Plaintiffs also brought claims that the survey violated their rights under the Family
Educational Records Act (FERPA) and Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment
(PPRA). See Ridgewood, 430 F.3d at 171 n.13 (noting other statutory claims). Fol-
lowing discovery, however, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the statutory claims. See
id. (acknowledging dismissal of statutory claims in prior proceedings and omitting
any discussion of those portions of prior opinions).
76. See C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 146 F. Supp. 2d 528, 538 (D.N.J.
2004) (summarizing that district court rejected compelled speech claim because
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ments for "unreasonable intrusion into the household" and a violation of
the "right to privacy." 77 Finally, Plaintiffs brought a substantive due pro-
cess claim, arguing that the survey infringed on the parents' right to raise
their child as they see fit.
78
The United States District Court for the District of NewJersey granted
summary judgment for the School, finding no indication that a voluntary
and anonymous survey, that was used to obtain data in the aggregate,
would violate a parent's constitutional rights. 79 Particularly, the district
court found the School did not impinge on the Plaintiffs' right to raise
their children in a manner of their choosing because "parents were pro-
vided ample notice of the administration of the survey" and were "in-
formed that the survey was voluntary and anonymous."80 The Plaintiffs
appealed and the Third Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part and re-
manded concluding that it was disputed whether student participation in
the survey was voluntary. 8 1 On remand, the district court again dismissed
the action, concluding that the Plaintiffs failed to identify any constitu-
tional violations.8 2 On December 1, 2005, the Plaintiffs filed an appeal in
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.8 3
C. Voluntary or Involuntary?
Due to the direct and indirect influences on students taking the sur-
vey, the Third Circuit determined that there was a reasonable inference
"the Board... compelled nothing" and "no adverse repercussions would occur if a
student decided not to answer the survey").
77. See id. at 539 (rejecting claims because district court interpreted record to
show only that survey was voluntary and anonymous).
78. See id. (refusing to recognize claim because defendants' conduct "d[id]
not rise to the level of a constitutional violation" and did not actually infringe on
right).
79. See id. at 535 (holding no cause of action for constitutional violations lay
against Board under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because "the official policy of the Board was
that the survey be administered voluntarily and anonymously"). To impose indi-
vidual liability on school board members under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the parents were
required to show that each member individually participated in or approved the
alleged constitutional violation. See Ridgewood, 430 F.3d at 173-74 (explaining
school board members may be entitled to qualified immunity if "their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known").
80. See Ridgewood, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 539-40 (quoting Gruenke v. Seip, 225
F.3d 290, 309 (3d Cir. 2000)) (recognizing substantive due process claim parents
alleged only arises where state attempts to "eliminate a parent's role in the custody
or nurture of the child").
81. See Ridgewood, 430 F.3d at 172 (explaining that Third Circuit dismissed
Fifth Amendment self-incrimination claim because survey was deemed
anonymous).
82. See id. (citing district court's conclusion that "even assuming the survey
had been involuntary, no constitutional violations had occurred").
83. See id. (detailing procedural history).
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that the survey was involuntary.84 Rather than looking only at the School
Board's intent for administering the survey, the Third Circuit determined
that the administration of the survey would leave many students feeling as
though they had no choice but to take the survey.8 5 Particularly, the court
looked at the factors surrounding the administration of the survey and
determined that the survey instructions were similar to what students
might hear before mandatory state testing.8 6 Moreover, the court noted
that it was peculiar that 100% of students took the survey.8 7 While the
court disagreed with the district court and found that the survey had a
disputed issue as to the material fact of voluntariness, it did agree with the
district court's finding that the survey was anonymous.
88
D. The Ridgewood Survey: Constitutionally Protected
Despite finding the survey involuntary, the Third Circuit affirmed
summary judgment for the School Board, reasoning that the survey's inter-
ference with parental decision-making authority was not a constitutional
violation.8 9 While the Supreme Court has extended constitutional protec-
tion to parental decision-making regarding matters such as visitation and
the decision to enroll a child in a private school, the right to introduce
children to sensitive topics was not a matter of comparable gravity.90 The
84. See id. at 175 (noting that by "involuntary" court means only that students
were required to participate in survey). As the court notes, it is difficult to summa-
rize the administration of the survey because it was given in multiple classrooms in
two different schools. See id. (identifying one teacher who told students that they
were required to take survey).
85. See id. (listing factors that helped court determine survey was involuntary).
Further, the schools made absent students "make up" the survey when they re-
turned. See id. (implying record suggests school officials attempted to guarantee
fullest participation).
86. See id. (acknowledging inference of test environment during survey
administration).
87. See id. at 175-76 (explaining court further identified that school board
should have distributed consent form to parents instructing how to avoid their
child's participation). Lack of consent was one of the main factors that went into
New Jersey passing the "Protection of Pupil Rights" law. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §
18A:36-34 (West 2006) (requiring "prior written informed consent" before school
administers survey like one in Ridgewood).
88. See Ridgewood, 430 F.3d at 177 (deeming evidence that one student had
teacher look over his shoulder and requiring students to retake survey in one-on-
one setting did not establish cause for lack of anonymity).
89. See id. at 183-84 (reasoning that Third Circuit did not "base... rejection
of familial fight to privacy claim on characterization of record that assumes volun-
tariness"). Compare id. with Parents United for Better Schs., Inc. v. Sch. Dist. of
Phila. Bd. of Educ., 148 F.3d 260, 274-75 (3d. Cir 1998) (rejecting familial right to
privacy claim because parental opt-out provision for voluntary high school condom
distribution program).
90. See Ridgewood, 430 F.3d at 185 (explaining Third Circuit was not rejecting
Supreme Court precedent); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000)
(finding visitation is fundamental right); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534-35 (1925) (acknowledging parent's right to direct upbringing of child). By
not following Pierce or Meyer, the court has been highly criticized for ignoring dom-
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court in Ridgewood, however, recognized that introducing a child to sensi-
tive topics could potentially complicate and undermine parental
authority.91
Unlike the Gruenke decision, the Third Circuit rationalized that asking
students survey questions about sensitive material did not intrude on pa-
rental decision-making authority in the same sense as a forced pregnancy
test.9 2 The court recognized Gruenke and Ridgewood as "the distinction be-
tween actions that strike at the heart of parental decision-making authority
on matters of the greatest importance and other actions that-although
unwise and offensive-are not of constitutional dimension."9 3 While par-
ents maintain the primary responsibility to teach their children about
these sensitive topics, the court identified numerous influences surround-
ing students that are beyond the strict control of parents. 94 Instead of
ignoring the reality that their children have already been exposed to these
topics, parents should use this survey as an opportunity to discuss the sen-
sitive material and place it in the context of the family's moral values.
95
The court, however, pointed out that they were not following the ra-
tionale from Fields.96 Instead of closing a parent's rights under Meyer-Pierce
at the "threshold of the school door," the Third Circuit acknowledged that
instances similar to Gruenke would still be possible constitutional viola-
tions.9 7 The court also was careful to note that this case was unlike Parents
United for Better Schools-which contained a parent opt-out provision to a
condom distribution program-because the Ridgewood survey was involun-
inant Supreme Court precedent. See Andrew Longman, Alito Shines Forth in the
Night, SURVEYING LAW, Dec. 6, 2005, http://www.splc.org/legalresearch.asp?id=66
(last visited July 26, 2006) (questioning whether Samuel Alito is fit to serve as Su-
preme Court Justice).
91. See Ridgewood, 430 F.3d at 185 (urging parents remain free to discuss these
matters with their children and to place these topics in family's morals or religious
context).
92. See id. at 185 n.26 (citing Gruenke rationale); see also Gruenke v. Seip, 225
F.3d 290, 307 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972))
(noting court stressed that it is primarily "parents' responsibility 'to inculcate
moral standards, religious belief and elements of good citizenship'").
93. Ridgewood, 430 F.3d at 185 (stressing school officials in no way indoctri-
nated students in any particular outlook on these sensitive topics); see also Hodge v.
Jones, 31 F.3d 157, 163 (4th Cir. 1994) (recognizing similar distinction to familial
privacy right).
94. See Ridgewood, 430 F.3d at 185 (promoting theory that students already
have knowledge on these sensitive topics from peers).
95. See id. (acknowledging parents argument that survey intruded upon pa-
rental authority "to decide when and how to introduce their children to sensitive
topics").
96. See id. at 185 n.26 (rejecting Fields conclusion that right of parents under
Meyer-Pierce "does not extend beyond the threshold of the school door").
97. See id. (denying application of categorical approach to this right taken by
Fields court, where Meyer-Pierce claim is only triggered concerning whether or not
parent chooses to send their child to public school).
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tary.98 Although the legitimacy and strength of the parental interest at
stake had been recognized by the NewJersey Legislature, the court found
it did not follow that the survey violated the Constitution.99 The Ridgewood
decision did not specifically follow any precedent; instead the court rea-
soned that the survey's interference with parental decision-making author-
ity merely did not amount to a constitutional violation. 10 0
IV. CHANGING TIMES AND THE REMEDIAL MEASURES
AFFORDED TO PARENTS
A. Let's Talk About Sex and Drugs: Are Surveys the Problem or the Solution?
The Third Circuit's opinion in Ridgewood is important to the current
legal landscape because it recognizes the importance of familial integrity
while focusing on the influences surrounding children today.1 01 It is un-
disputed that parents legally remain the sole decision makers for their
children.10 2 This right, however, is neither absolute nor unqualified.10 3
Ridgewood is another example of the judicial trend shifting parental au-
thority over to schools. 10 4 Accompanying this judicial trend is a cultural
98. See id. at 183 (distinguishing issue of parental consent). The right for
minors to receive information about sexuality and contraception "flows analytically
from the privacy right to obtain abortions without parental consent." See Ross,
supra note 27, at 259-61 (summarizing argument that right to contraceptives is just
as important as right to abortions).
99. See Ridgewood, 430 F.3d at 185 (recognizing enactment of "Protection of
Pupil Rights" law). Requiring prior parental consent gives more authority to the
parents than having a parent opt-out provision similar to the condom distribution
program in Parents United for Better Schools. See Perry, supra note 26, at 729 (arguing
opt-out provisions place burden on parents to act affirmatively to reclaim their
legal authority).
100. See Ridgewood, 430 F.3d at 184-85 (using other circuit court cases as in-
structive but distinguishing Ridgewood on its facts).
101. See id. at 185 (recognizing numerous influences around children in
schools). One of the prominent reasons most teenagers use or experiment with
drugs is peer pressure. See, e.g., Andrew D. Leipold, The War on Drugs and the Puzzle
of Deterrence, 6J. GENDER RACE &JUsT. 111, 117 n.27 (2002) (listing factors that
cause teenagers to experiment with drugs are peer pressure (eighty-two percent of
those surveyed identified this as major factor) and lack of parental supervision
(seventy-nine percent say this is major factor)).
102. See Ridgewood, 430 F.3d at 185 (acknowledging well-established Supreme
Court precedent that parents have right to control upbringing and education of
their children).
103. See generally Emily Buss, Adrift in the Middle: Parental Rights After Troxel v.
Granville, 2000 Sup. CT. REv. 279 (2000) (explaining, following recent Supreme
Court cases, that parental constitutional right to raise their child is not absolute).
Notably, the author points out the potential problems with the court completely
abandoning parents' constitutional protection. See id. at 298-99 (arguing any value
coming from ensuring democratic control would be attenuated because children
do not vote and policy-making will occur at distance from lawmaking majority).
104. See Mawdsley, supra note 19, at 179-86 (discussing trend from past thirty
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shift that exposes children to drugs, sex, alcohol and violence at a younger
age. 10 Ignoring the court's ability to evolve with the current societal land-
scape disregards the fact that the law and education are historically inter-
twined through the evolution of this country and Supreme Court
precedent.106
Perhaps the greatest obstacle in determining whether a school survey
violates a parent's constitutional rights is the differing characterizations of
the result of the survey. 10 7 The school characterized this survey as the
solution-or a step towards the solution-to a better understanding of the
Ridgewood youth. 10 8 Alternatively, the parents in Ridgewood argued that
the surveys contributed to the problem with today's society; the survey in-
troduced students to sensitive material, which, in effect, took over the par-
ents' role. 10 9 Instead of the surveys remedying the problem, the parents
argued that the surveys put new ideas in a child's head, therefore causing
the problem. 1 10 This argument, however, is suspect because parents are
not only fighting against schools for the right to socialize their children,
they are fighting against the Internet, mass-media advertising and their
child's peers. 11 '
105. See Joseph Lintott, Teaching and Learning in the Face of School Violence, 11
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 553, 554-56 (2004) (commenting that schools have
been confronted with growing problem of violence in school in recent years); see
also James McGrath, Abstinence-Only Adolescent Education: Ineffective, Unpopular, and
Unconst-itutional, 38 U.S.F. L. REv. 665, 670 (2004) (dispelling myth that absti-
nence-only sexual education reduces teen sex by noting that while teenage preg-
nancy is down, rate of HIV is constant and soon to rise).
106. See Angela G. Smith, Public School Choice and Open Enrollment: Implications
for Education, Desegregation, and Equity, 74 NEB. L. REv. 255, 291 (1995) (recognizing
law is continually evolving in schools by noting Supreme Court decisions that pro-
moted vision of desegregating schools).
107. See generally Ridgewood, 430 F.3d at 159 (noting arguments made by both
parties for validity, effect and proposed result of administering survey).
108. See id. at 164 (providing letter Superintendent Frederick Stokely sent to
parents on September 1, 1999 explaining "[t]he information from the survey will
be used to identify the strengths and needs required to support youth and families
in the Village of Ridgewood"); see, e.g., Kladko, supra note 4, at Bi (explaining state
and local school districts claim surveys are meant to "help public health specialists
and educators learn more about student behavior").
109. See Ridgewood, 430 F.3d at 185 (summarizing parents' argument that sur-
vey intruded upon parental authority to decide when and how to introduce chil-
dren to sensitive topics); see also Schlafly, supra note 1 (claiming result of survey is
exposing children to new material and conveying that this behavior is normal).
110. See Schlafly, supra note 1 (noting argument that surveys introduce chil-
dren to understanding that taking drugs and having sex is common); see also Perry,
supra note 26, at 728 (indicating parents argue that sexual programs in school and
providing students with sexual protection promotes sexual activity). In essence,
Perry claims that parents are arguing that students would not be having sex if they
were not given condoms. See id. (same).
111. See Woodhouse, supra note 7, at 96 (exploring mass-media culture's ef-
fect on children); see also Ridgewood, 430 F.3d at 185 (reasoning that argument that
surveys should not be medium to expose children to these topics is flawed because
students are surrounded by numerous influences).
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Children are going to know about sex whether or not the school or
their parent gives them a condom. 1 2 Children are going to know about
school violence because they watch it unfold on the news with instances
such as Columbine. 113 Ignoring these trends has proven to have deadly
consequences. 1 4 Childhood innocence is a wonderful belief; unfortu-
nately, given the survey results and changes in society, this concept has
long been outdated.
15
B. Remedial Measures for Parents
In spite of the information derived from these surveys-including sta-
tistics showing substantial teen drug and alcohol use 1 6 and recent school
violence 117 -parents continue to claim these survey questions introduce
students to new topics and suggest that drug use is normal behavior.1 18
112. See McGrath, supra note 105, at 676-81 (commenting that "Abstinence-
Only" sex education programs fail to provide students with necessary information
about HIV prevention education, condoms and sexually transmitted diseases).
The author contends that abstinence-only sexual education wastes valuable public
resources because they deny adolescents access to potentially lifesaving informa-
tion. See id. at 699 (arguing funding for these programs does not agree with na-
tion's morals but rather furthers goals that were formerly seen as "coinciding" with
religious ideals).
113. See Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Mediated Images of Violence and the
First Amendment: From Video Games to the Evening News, 57 ME. L. REv. 91, 110 (2005)
(commenting it is odd that lawmakers exhibit passion toward banning and rating
video games while they disregard shielding children from images of real violence
in media).
114. See McGrath, supra note 105, at 665 (explaining abstinence-only pro-
grams are dangerous because they fail to protect nation's youth against serious
diseases).
115. See generally Gary A. Debele, A Children's Rights Approach to Relocation: A
Meaningful Best Interests Standard, 15 J. Am. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 75, 86 (1998)
(commenting that up until 1960s, media paid homage to notion of childhood in-
nocence, but this has been replaced by increasingly sexualized images of younger
childlike models and ads for various products).
116. For a discussion of school survey results, see supra notes 2 and 3 and
accompanying text. A recent Illinois survey reported that 60% of high school ju-
niors and seniors admitted that they had been passengers in cars piloted by drunk
drivers during the past year. Paula M. Davenport, Sobering New Statistics on Teenage
Drunk Driving, May 7, 2002, http://news.siu.edu/news/May02/050702p2055.html
(last visited Feb. 20, 2006) (acknowledging "drunk driving is leading cause of
death among young Americans").
117. See Lintott, supra note 105, at 564 n.103 (illustrating school violence with
tragic shooting at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado, where thirteen
students died). School violence is a widespread epidemic across the entire coun-
try. See Safer School News, http://www.keystosaferschools.com/violence03.htm
(last visited Feb. 20, 2006) (listing reported instances of school violence in 2003
and 2004).
118. See Schlafly, supra note 1 (explaining surveys are offensive, privacy-invad-
ing interrogation of children in public schools); see, e.g., Jim Tankersley, Parents
Question Survey Content Distributed to Seventh-Graders, THE OREGONIAN (Portland,
Or.), Oct. 25, 2001, at 1 (noting that parents argue surveys asking their children
about drug use, sexual activity and suicide should not be administered in schools).
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Recent circuit court opinions have confirmed that courts are probably not
willing to extend the Constitution to find that school surveys interfere with
parental decision-making authority. 119 Because it does not seem as
though parents are going to be able to get the surveys out of schools, they
seek the next best option, consent.1 20 In reaction to Ridgewood and Fields,
parents have taken their battle to the legislators, lobbying to pass new laws
that require parental consent for these surveys. 121 Laws like NewJersey's
Protection of Pupil Rights Bill provide parents with a remedy to keep con-
trol over whether their child will have to take these surveys. 122
C. Circuit Differences and the Future
While many circuit courts agree that the surveys do not violate par-
ents' right to raise their children, the courts disagree as to the extent to
which the parents' right exists. 12 3 In Gruenke, the Third Circuit stressed
that schools need to be cognizant of the line between educating children
and completely usurping parents' right to raise their children. 12 4 The
119. See C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. Of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 186 (3d Cir. 2005)
(denying parents' claim for constitutional violation of parents' right to raise child
as they see fit); see also Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1208 (9th Cir.
2005) (refusing to extend parents' right to control education into classroom).
120. See Fields, 427 F.3d at 1202 (commenting parents claimed lack of consent
for elementary school children to take survey because school gained consent with-
out disclosing that sexually explicit questions would be asked).
121. See Cheryl Wetzstein, All That Schools Survey; Questionnaires Stir Debate over
Privacy Rights Versus Research, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2002, at A2 (explaining legiti-
macy and strength of parental interest was recognized by New Jersey Legislature,
that enacted state's "Protection of Pupil Rights" law). A law was passed in New
Jersey in 2001 requiring written parental consent before giving surveys or tests ask-
ing for information about political affiliations, potentially embarrassing mental
and psychological problems, sexual behavior and attitudes. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §
18A:36-34 (West 2006) (prohibiting students from taking such surveys adminis-
tered in New Jersey's public schools without parental consent obtained two weeks
prior to survey); see also Lisa Friedman, House Takes on Court Stance; School Sex-Survey
Decision Enrages Reps, THE DAILY NEWS OF Los ANGELES, Nov. 17, 2005, at AVI (not-
ing lawmakers in U.S. House overwhelmingly denounced Fields decision).
122. See Robert G. Seidenstein, Alito Agrees: School Survey Doesn't Violate
Parental Rights, N.J. LAWYER, Dec. 5, 2005, at 2 (recognizing survey controversy led
to state law requiring parental written consent). Recently, parents have looked to
Congress and state legislatures to reassert their parental authority. See Mawdsley,
supra note 19, at 178 (commenting that while federal and state statutes have in-
creased parental authority, no wide-ranging constitutional protection exists as an-
ticipated after Meyer and Pierce). Further, Mawdsley notes that state legislature has
mainly been limited to a parent's choice of whether to send their child to public or
private school. See id. at 177 (declaring most states continue to prohibit parents
from intruding into curricular matters in public schools).
123. See Fields, 427 F.3d at 1208 (drawing line of parents' right to raise their
child at school door). Compare id. with Ridgewood, 430 F.3d at 185 n.26 (refusing to
follow strict law of Fields).
124. See Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 307 (3d Cir. 2000) (maintaining par-
ents have primary right to inculcate moral standards in determining whether pa-
rental decision alleged to have been usurped is of comparable gravity of those
protected by Supreme Court precedent).
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Third Circuit places great weight on the reality of youth; these surveys do
not indoctrinate students with any particular outlook on these sensitive
topics.1 25 At most, they introduce a few topics unknown to certain individ-
uals.1 26 Unlike Fields, however, the Third Circuit did not throw out the
Meyer-Pierce rubric and find that this right "does not extend beyond the
threshold of the school door."127 Alternatively, the Ridgewood opinion left
open a judicial avenue-albeit a small one-for parents to challenge the
content of their child's education.
128
Considering Ridgewood and Fields, it is difficult to determine whether
an anonymous school survey could ever violate parents' right to raise their
children.12 9 Public schools need the flexibility to develop the curriculum
so to best structure it to serve today's youth. 13 0 Although this need for
flexibility might impinge on parents' plans to discuss drugs and sex with
their children, it seems as though the Supreme Court is going to continue
to side with the schools. 13 1 Schools are not only a place where students
learn about academics; they are educational institutions that teach stu-
125. See Ridgewood, 430 F.3d at 185 (observing that school survey did not advo-
cate any particular viewpoint on topics).
126. See id. (acknowledging surveys could potentially make parental role more
difficult). For a discussion of the parents' argument, see supra notes 109-10 and
accompanying text.
127. See id. at 185 n.26 (rejecting Fields court decision finding that claim
grounded in Meyers-Pierce will only trigger inquiry into whether or not parents
chose to send their child to public school).
128. See id. (allowing constitutional claims when school takes away parental
right of gravity similar to Gruenke); see also Arnold v. Bd. of Educ., 880 F.2d 305, 314
(11th Cir. 1989) (prohibiting guidance counselors from coercing minors to ab-
stain from communicating with their parents). While the holdings of Gruenke and
Arnold recognize that parental rights are diminished in public schools, they refuse
to categorically deny any rights of parents in public schools. See Ridgewood, 430
F.3d at 185 n.26 (determining only that, on facts presented, parental rights claim
did not meet Supreme Court precedent standard to amount to constitutional
violation).
129. See Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1208 (9th Cir. 2005)
(commenting parental rights are diminished in school environment); see also Ridge-
wood, 430 F.3d at 185 (refusing to find survey to rise to constitutional violation).
130. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 691 (1954) (explaining educa-
tion extends beyond curriculum); see also Mawdsley, supra note 19, at 186 (same).
Mawdsley suggests that recent case law enhancing schools' control over the learn-
ing environment could mean parents have lost any protectible fight to direct their
child's upbringing inside a public school. See id. at 190 (implying recent lawsuits
brought by parents alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 will continue to not reach
curriculum).
131. See Ridgewood, 430 F.3d at 185 (siding with school board in finding survey
did not take away parents' right to raise their children as they see fit); see also Perry,
supra note 26, at 728-29 (arguing courts should use strict scrutiny review when
determining if school has usurped parental right). Perry argues that strict scrutiny
would be satisfied for condom distribution programs and sexual education in
schools because states have a compelling interest to protect children from sexually
transmitted diseases and sexual education is both a necessary and narrowly tai-
lored means to meeting the goal. See id. (noting parents' argument that sexually
explicit programs encourage sex and cross line between complementing parental
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dents everything from mathematics to sex. 132 Following the Supreme
Court's lead, it seems as though the Third Circuit will similarly continue to
be lenient in its approach of policing school actions.
133
V. CONCLUSION
The decision in Ridgewood instructs practitioners litigating parental
rights issues in the Third Circuit that certain key factors may be necessary
to a successful litigation strategy. 1 34 For example, it is important to distin-
guish the particular parental rights claim from Supreme Court prece-
dent.135 The Supreme Court has granted schools great leeway to design
and enforce the curriculum. 136 Moreover, litigators should focus on argu-
ing that the particular parental right that is being taken away "strikes the
heart" of the parental decision-making authority.
13 7
Decisions that strike the heart of parental decision-making authority
have been difficult to prove in the Third Circuit.138 The Third Circuit's
preferred analysis seems to provide the school with great deference in
questioning students about sensitive material.139 Although the Third Cir-
cuit did maintain an avenue for parents to challenge the content of their
child's education, it is likely that this avenue will probably not include
school surveys.'
40
guidance and displacing it). Compare id. with Fields, 427 F.3d at 1208 (applying
rational basis review for school survey).
132. See generally Fields, 427 F.3d at 1209 (explaining school has responsibility
to teach children not only about academics, but about cultural and social values).
133. See Ridgewood, 430 F.3d at 182 (acknowledging Supreme Court has no
precise boundaries of parent's right to control child's upbringing and education
but holding surveys would not fall under this right).
134. For a discussion of important litigation factors, see infra notes 13544 and
accompanying text.
135. For a discussion of the Supreme Court precedent, see supra notes 16-31
and accompanying text.
136. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's allowance of school power over
the curriculum in Ridgewood, see supra notes 84-100 and accompanying text.
137. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's distinction of matters striking the
heart of the parental decision-making authority, see supra notes 32-47 and accom-
panying text.
138. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's comparison of Gruenke and Ridge-
wood, see supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
139. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's finding that the survey did not
violate the parents' right even though the survey was involuntary, see supra notes
84-100 and accompanying text.
140. See C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 185 n.26 (3d Cir.
2005) (implying avenue for parental rights claims will be constrained to claims
similar to Gruenke). Moreover, it is already apparent how one of the Justices on the
Supreme Court will rule on this issue because Samuel Alito-the most recent Su-
preme Court appointee-was one of the judges in the Ridgewood case. See Longman,
supra note 90 (acknowledging Alito was on Third Circuit at time of Ridgewood
decision).
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Those challenging a school action should look to the Gruenke analysis
to support their claim.1 4 ' Further, they should argue that the right to
challenge educational content must contain more than the options of pri-
vate school or home schooling because of the expense and viability of
these options. 142 Those defending against school survey challenges
should focus on the Supreme Court precedent and the school's recent
control over the curriculum, as did the defendant school board in Ridge-
wood, arguing that the survey does not remove the parent's constitutional
rights.1 43 Given the Supreme Court and Third Circuit precedent, the en-
vironment surrounding teenagers today and the fact that the Third Circuit
is protecting the Constitution, it seems school surveys are here to stay. 144
Robert Kubica
141. See Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 307 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining family
crisis in which State had no right to obstruct parental right to choose proper
method of solution).
142. SeeWoodhouse, supra note 19, at 500 (promoting that states using public
money to fund private religious schools will lead to marginalization of state public
education). Woodhouse argues that education is beginning to move from a public
commitment to a private good. See id. (claiming "free public education as each
child's stepping stone to equality has been replaced by a new privatized vision
based on parents' rights of control").
143. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's dependence on history in Ridge-
wood, see supra notes 85-96 and accompanying text.
144. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's rationale in finding no parental
fight was violated, see supra notes 85-96 and accompanying text.
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